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life style choices, increasing the propensity to heavy smoking, seden-
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11 Introduction
Ex ante moral hazard is an important theoretical concept in Health Eco-
nomics. Ehrlich and Becker (1972) were among the ￿rst to propose a model
describing the complex relationship between health insurance and preven-
tive activities. While some kinds of preventive actions are complementary to
market insurance, others can be shown to be substitutes. That is, ex ante
moral hazard exists in some circumstances, implying that individuals become
more reckless about their future health when they are covered by health in-
surance. This might a⁄ect the demand for preventive health services and
also individual lifestyle choices which in￿ uence future health.
Until recently, there has been a widespread view in the literature that,
although a theoretical possibility, ex ante moral hazard has possibly lim-
ited practical consequences. Some authors (eg. Kenkel 2000, Zweifel and
Manning 2000) have suggested that the welfare loss from ex ante moral haz-
ard is probably small, because health insurance o⁄ers incomplete coverage.
Although the monetary component is covered, there are still signi￿cant util-
ity losses in terms of pain and su⁄ering, which reduce individual incentives
to engage in harmful activities1. In other words, risk aversion contributes to
make indeterminate the e⁄ect of insurance coverage on preventive activities
(see Zweifel and Manning 2000).
1A similar argument should also apply to workers￿compensation. The possibility of
serious health consequences should make it unlikely that more generous bene￿ts induce
workers to become more reckless. However, several studies have documented this e⁄ect.
2In the empirical literature, several studies have tended to corroborate
this view that ex ante moral hazard is of limited importance. Kenkel (1994)
has studied the in￿ uence of private insurance on the demand for preventive
health care (breast exams and pap tests), ￿nding important lifecycle and
schooling e⁄ects. Kenkel (1994) ￿nds that the use of preventive services
decreases with age, which suggests an adaptation to shortening payo⁄period
to invesment in prevention. Increasing coverage for curative services also
increases the demand for preventive care, because the out-of-pocket cost is
reduced (see also Courbage and de Coulon 2004, PagÆn, Puig and Soldo
2007). This suggests that the two types of care are complements, and may
serve as substitutes for patient own preventive e⁄ort.
Courbage and de Coulon (2004) investigate how private health insurance
a⁄ects the demand for preventive care (insured) and individual behaviours
(non-insured) in the UK. As discussed above, health insurance might increase
the demand for insured preventive services simply because the cost for the
patient is reduced, but it is unlikely to increase non-insured activities. There-
fore, this distinction might help to disentangle the ex ante and ex post moral
hazard e⁄ects. Their results, based on univariate probit regressions control-
ling for individual observed characteristics, show that private health insur-
ance increases the probability of exercising and undergoing breast screening,
and reduces the probability of smoking. The authors hypothesise that this
might be due to the fact that insurance makes individuals more concerned
about the risks they are facing. We argue below, however, that this argument
3ignores the fact that health insurance demand and life style choices might be
in￿ uenced by common unobservable characteristics of the individual.
In recent years, new studies have started to provide additional evidence
on the existence of ex ante moral hazard. Dave and Kaestner (2006) have
explored the e⁄ect of health insurance on health behaviours, arguing that
there is a direct (ex ante moral hazard) and indirect e⁄ect. The indirect
e⁄ect works through increased contact with health professionals, which might
improve health information and reduce the probability of illness.
Focusing on the e⁄ect of health knowledge on health behaviour, Kenkel
(1991) also tests the hypothesis that increased contact with health profes-
sionals granted by health insurance might improve health knowledge and
decrease the propensity to engage in harmful health-related behaviours. The
results show that health knowledge decreases smoking and heavy drinking,
and increases exercise, but there is still a signi￿cant in￿ uence of schooling.
This suggests the existence of unobservable factors which a⁄ect both school-
ing and health-related behaviour. Similarly, Zweifel and Manning (2000)
comment on the likely endogeneity between insurance coverage and wage
income.
A major point in Dave and Kaestner￿ s (2006) study is to consider the
exogenous change in insurance status that takes place as people above 65
years old become automatically elegible for Medicare. This allows to identify
the ex ante moral hazard, since insurance coverage is independent from health
related behaviour. Likewise, Bhattacharya and Sood (2006) research the
4relation between insurance and obesity. They show that, when premiums are
not risk rated for obesity, there is a signi￿cant negative externality on non-
obese enrolees, which appears because obese enrolees have higher expected
medical expenditures.
Another important question relates to the relationship between health
risk and insurance demand. Some studies (eg Bundorf, Herring and Pauly
2005, Cardon and Hendel 2001) ￿nd evidence of positive relationship between
health risk and insurance demand, which is consistent with the existence
of adverse selection in the insurance market. Likewise, Courbage and Rey
(2006) argue that the fear of sickness exerts a positive in￿ uence on the level
of e⁄ort to prevent the occurrence of sickness. However, other empirical
evidence suggests the opposite, that health risk is negatively associated with
insurance coverage. For example, Finkelstein and McGarry (2003) ￿nd that
individuals who invest more on prevention, and therefore have lower risk,
also spend more on insurance. They suggest this might be explained by
"other unobserved characteristics that are positively related to coverage and
negatively related to risk occurence". This also provides some support for
the idea of propitious selection, which has been suggested in the literature
(see Chiappori and SalaniØ 2000, de Donder and Hindriks 2006, Hemenway
1990, Hemenway 1992, Jullien, SalaniØ and SalaniØ 1999, de Meza and Webb
2001, Pauly and Held 1990).
Recent studies (eg. Contoyannis and Jones 2004, Balia and Jones 2005)
show that lifestyle choices are an important determinant of individual health.
5Habits like smoking or excess drinking have harmful e⁄ects on health status
and increase the probability of disease and premature death. As a result,
health care expenses are also adversely a⁄ected, imposing external costs on
the society.
Manning, Keeler, Newhouse, Sloss and Wasserman (1991) have shown
that, apart from the internal costs imposed on the individual and the fam-
ily, over the lifetime each smoker creates an external cost of 15 cents per
pack of cigarettes2 in terms of increased medical expenses and ￿re damage,
and of lower income taxation. Some studies suggest that, due to lower life
expectancy, smokers in average can expect to make make positive net contri-
butions to Social Security. Even after controlling for this, Sloan, Ostermann,
Picone, Conover and Taylor (2004) estimate the lifetime total social cost of
smoking at $106,000 for a woman and $220,000 for a man. The study by
Bhattacharya and Sood (2006) cited above estimates that uniform insurance
premiums impose an externality of $150 per capita per year on non-obese
enrolees resulting from increased health expenditures incurred by obese en-
rolees.
To date most empirical papers have tended to focus on the demand for
preventive services or diagnostic tests (eg. Kenkel 1994). By focusing on
the e⁄ect of health insurance on lifestyle choices this study would ￿ll an
important gap, which has implications for the design of both private plans
2In 1986 US dollars. For comparison, the price of a pack of cigarrettes was about US$
1.
6and public systems of social security (see Courbage and de Coulon 2004).
This paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a theoretical
model for insurance demand and lifestyle choices, which emphasises the pos-
sibility of ex ante moral hazard when premiums are not risk rated. Section
3 describes the dataset used for this study, the waves of 1999, 2001 and 2003
of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. The econometric strategy and the
estimated models are presented in Section 4. Section 5 then gives the results
and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework used here is an extension of the models proposed
by Ehrlich and Becker (1972) and Zweifel and Breyer (1997). The consumer
makes two related choices. First, the individual decides whether to buy
insurance coverage to protect from the cost of medical expenditures in the
case of illness, which occurs with probability ￿. Second, the consumer makes
a binary decision s = (0;1) about whether to engage in a risky behaviour,
which corresponds to the lifestyle choices of smoking, drinking, exercising
and obesity that we are interested in. The risky behaviour provides a level
of utility v(s) and increases the probability of illness at a decreasing rate
(￿0 > 0;￿00 < 0).
The individual is initially endowed with exogenous wealth y. In the sick
state, the individual su⁄ers a monetary loss L corresponding to medical care.
7The insurance contract charges premium P(s;I), and, in turn, provides an
indemnity payment I, which covers all or part of the medical expenses (0 ￿
I ￿ L). Both the utility from wealth and the utility from the risky behaviour
are assumed to be increasing and concave (u0 > 0;u00 < 0 and v0 > 0;v00 < 0).
We normalise to one the price of engaging in the risky behaviour.
2.1 Optimal choice of life style without insurance
We ￿rst consider the optimal choice of the risky behaviour when health in-
surance coverage is not available. The individual choice consists of only one
stage and can be represented by:
max
s
EU = (1 ￿ ￿(s))u(y ￿ s) + ￿(s)u(y ￿ s ￿ L) + v(s): (1)









Proof. The result is obtained by di⁄erentiating (1) with respect to the risky
behaviour choice. The Second Order Condition is ￿ = ￿￿00(s)(uh ￿ us) +
2￿0(s)(u0
h ￿ u0
s) + (1 ￿ ￿(s))u00
h + ￿(s)u00
s + v00(s) < 0. Considering that the
marginal bene￿t of the risky behaviour is decreasing (v00(s) < 0), if ￿00(s) > 0
the SOC is always satis￿ed, and it may or may not be satis￿ed if ￿00(s) < 0.
8Let uh and us denote the utility in the healthy and sick state, and u0
h and
u0
s denote the corresponding marginal utilities. The FOC (2) describes the
optimal choice s￿ of risky behaviour with uniform premiums. The left-hand
sides is the marginal bene￿t that the individual receives from engaging in the
risk behaviour. The ￿rst term on the right represents the marginal cost in
terms of the increased probability of experiencing the utility loss associated
with the sick state, while the other two terms give the reduction in utility in
both states associated with the cost of the risky behaviour.
2.2 Simultaneous choice of health insurance and life
style
Following Ehrlich and Becker (1972), we now consider the incentives for risky
behaviour when the individual has the option to contract health insurance.
Other empirical studies have tended to assume that the two decisions are
not correlated. However, it is reasonable to expect that there are common
elements which a⁄ect both decisions3. For example, factors such as expec-
tations about future health and attitudes towards risk might in￿ uence both
the propensity to self-select into insurance and the decision to adopt a par-
ticular life style (see for example Cardon and Hendel 2001). Ignoring these
in￿ uences might result in biased estimates of the relation between insurance
3When considering the incentives for self-protection, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) argue
that "optimal decisions about market insurance depend on the availability of these other
activities and should be viewed within the context of a more comprehensive "insurance"
decision" (p. 624).
9and life style.
2.2.1 Risk rated premiums
First let us consider the case of risk rated premiums, when the insurer adjusts
the premium according to individual choices with respect to the risky behav-
iour. We assume the insurer can observe the individual risky behaviour. The
insurance premium P(s;I) depends on the level of coverage and varies with
the individual choice with respect to the risky behaviour. Speci￿cally, we
assume insurance premiums are actuarially fair, and equal the expected loss
for the insurer:
P(s;I) = E[I] = ￿(s)I: (3)





The First Order Conditions (FOC) are:
s
￿￿ : v




￿￿ : I = L: (6)























. From (3), we obtain
@P(s;I)
@I = ￿(s), which we substitute into
10the FOC: u0
h = u0
s, which implies y￿s￿P(s;I) = y￿s￿P(s;I)￿L+I and

























The FOC wrt indemnity (6) implies the ￿rst term on the right vanishes, and
allows us to rewrite u0
h = u0
s = u0 and I = L. Thus from (3) we obtain:
@P(s;I)
@s = ￿0(s)I ) v0(s) = (1 + ￿0(s)I)u0. The Second Order Condition are
EUss =, EUII = and ￿ = EUssEUII ￿ (EUsI)
2 > 0.
According to the FOC with respect to the indemnity level (6), the indi-
vidual will choose full coverage when premiums are actuarially fair, which is
a standard result in Insurance Economics.
Now focus on the FOC with respect to the life style choice. According to
(5), the individual trades-o⁄ the marginal bene￿t from engaging in the risk
behaviour (LHS) with the marginal cost, which is given by the marginal cost
of the life style choice plus the expected premium increase, both evaluated in
terms of marginal utility. This result implies that the optimal choice in this
case is equivalent to the solution corresponding to income maximisation in the
absence of insurance. Therefore, as suggested by Ehrlich and Becker (1972)
and Zweifel and Breyer (1997), risk rated premiums mitigate ex ante moral
hazard since the individual choice of life style is the same that maximises
11income in the absence of insurance4.
2.2.2 Uniform premiums
Now let us focus on the case when health insurance premiums do not depend
on life style choices. This is equivalent to assume that the life style choices
are not observable or not contractable. Now the premium is a function only
of the insurer loss:
P = P(I): (7)
The sequential decision process comprises two stages, ￿rst the decision to
insure and then the decision on whether to engage in the risky life style. By
backward induction, we consider ￿rst the life style choice, taking the level of
insurance as given:
max














s + v0(s) = 0, and rearrange the FOC (8).
4This result is slightly di⁄erent from Ehrlich and Becker￿ s (1972) analysis of optimal
prevention because here one also needs to take into account the marginal utility of the life
style choice. Speci￿cally, one can show that: ￿￿0(s)L ￿ 1 if v0(s) ￿ u0 and ￿￿0(s)L < 1
otherwise.
12Following Zweifel and Breyer (1997), this FOC can be interpreted as a
reaction curve, which describes the optimal life style choice for each given
level of insurance coverage. This reaction curve has two important attributes
(see 10, p.181):
1. s+[0] is equivalent to s￿ given by (2), that is, it corresponds to the same
optimal choice in the absence of market insurance and
2. s+[L] is equal to zero, since I = L yields yh = ys = y. Replacing this
into (9) implies dEU
ds = ￿u0(s) + v0(s) ? 0. This means that .....
Now return to the ￿rst stage of the decision process, when the individual
decides how much insurance coverage to contract by taking into account
















Proof. Di⁄erentiating (10) wrt indemnity choice, we obtain v0(s(I))@s
@I =
@s
@I [￿0(s(I))(uh ￿ us) + (1 ￿ ￿(s(I)))u0
h + ￿(s(I))u0




s. The FOC for life style choice implies that the ￿rst term among
13square brackets in the RHS is equal to v0(s(I)). Therefore, the FOC simpli￿es




According to (11), the individual chooses the level of insurance coverage
taking into account the marginal utility cost of increasing coverage associ-
ated with the increase in premium payments in both states (LHS), and the
marginal bene￿t, which is given by the increase in marginal utility in the sick
state (RHS).
3 Data
The data used in this paper comes from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID). As described in the website, the PSID is a nationally representative
longitudinal study of nearly 8,000 US families, which has been following the
same families and individuals since 1968. We analyse the waves of 1999, 2001
and 2003, which contain the information relative to lifestyle choices, health
insurance status and other indicators of health status which are relevant for
this analysis. We use a balanced sample of 5,126 individuals. The sample
includes only the heads of each household, which are all adult individuals (17
years and above).
In average 93% of individuals in the sample are covered by health insur-
ance. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics separating the sample into
insured and uninsured individuals. We notice several di⁄erences between
the two sub-samples. The uninsured sample can be considered more socio-
14economically deprived in many aspects. For instance, the average family in-
come is less than half of the insured sample (US$25,858 versus US$62,609),
and the average schooling is also lower. While in the insured sample 20%
of the individuals have only primary education and 48% have college educa-
tion, in the uninsured the proportions are practically inversed (44% and 21%,
respectively). The unemployment rate is markedly higher in the uninsured
sample (14% versus 5% in the insured sample), but the proportion of retired
people is lower (10% versus 18%). Finally, the combined proportion of black
and Hispanic individuals is almost double among the uninsured compared to
the insured (57% versus 32%).
Let us focus on the observed prevalence of the life style choices. In almost
all cases, the uninsured tend to lead a less healthy-conscious life style. They
tend to smoke more (5% of heavy smokers compared to 3% in the uninsured
sample), drink more alcohol (8% versus 4% of heavy drinkers) and to be
more sedentary (16% versus 11%). With respect to the prevalence of obesity,
however, the two groups fare very similarly (25% versus 26%).
For almost all health condition indicators the insured group reports higher
prevalence rates, both for life style-related (stroke, high blood pressure, di-
abetes, cancer, heart attack and coronary heart disease) and unrelated con-
ditions (emotional problems, arthritis and loss of mental ability). Perhaps
surprisingly, however, the proportion of individuals with fair or poor self-
assessed health is higher among the uninsured. As the measure of health
status is self-assessed, this might be related to di⁄erences among the two
15groups on individual perception about what constitutes bad health. How-
ever, as the health conditions depend on medical diagnosis, this might also
be explained by lower access to medical care among the uninsured.
4 Econometric model
Our primary interest is to determine the e⁄ect of health insurance coverage
on the individual propensity to particular life style choices. A natural way
to obtain this is to estimate reduced form equations for the life style choices
including health insurance as an explanatory variable. This is essentially the
approach implemented, inter alia, by Kenkel (1994) and Courbage and de
Coulon (2004).
As shown by the theoretical model above, however, the decision to obtain
health insurance is intrinsically correlated with life style decisions. In general
we might expect the existence of observable and unobservable individual
attributes that in￿ uence both health insurance coverage and the choice of life
style. Reduced form estimation such as in Kenkel (1994) and Courbage and
de Coulon (2004), although controlling for observable characteristics, ignores
the unobserved individual heterogeneity. Consequently, the estimated e⁄ect
of insurance is biased.
A candidate method to control for unobserved heterogeneity is to consider
an exogenous change in insurance status, and to evaluate how this change
might a⁄ect the moral hazard variable. Dave and Kaestner (2006) explore
16the "exogenous variation in health insurance as a result of obtaining Medicare
coverage at age 65". They ￿nd "limited evidence that obtaining health insur-
ance reduces prevention and increases unhealthy behaviours among elderly
people".
Our approach to identify the e⁄ect of health insurance on life style choices
is to estimate a system of equations based on the multivariate probit model
(see Wilde 2000, Cappelari and Jenkins 2003, Train 2003). The multivariate
probit is a 5-equation recursive model, with a structural equation for health
insurance coverage and reduced form equations for each of our four life style
choices: heavy smoking, heavy drinking, sedentarism and obesity. Health
insurance is included as explanatory variable in the reduced form equations
for life style. Moreover, the model allows the residuals in each equation to be
freely correlated, and in this way controls for the unobserved heterogeneity.
Let yiI denote a dummy variable for health insurance status. Also let
Y L
il = fyi1;yi2;yi3;yi4g denote a vector of four dummies representing the life
style choices of heavy smoking, heavy drinking, sedentarism and obesity. The
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Estimating univariate probit regressions for the life style choices implicitly
ignores the unobserved heterogeneity and assumes that the error terms are
uncorrelated (￿jk = 0 _ j 6= k). Therefore, the estimates for the e⁄ect of
insurance on life style choices are biased.
There are, however, some practical di¢ culties associated with the esti-






where ￿5 is the 5-dimensional multivariate standard normal distribution.
Therefore, the estimation of the multivariate probit requires the evaluation
of a 5-dimensional integral over the distribution of the correlated errors. This
integral does not have a closed form solution. Moreover, the elevated number
of dimensions implies that traditional methods such as the Gauss-Hermite
quadrature cannot be applied.
Our approach to circumvent this problem consists on approximating the
log-likelihood function using Maximum Simulated Likelihood. This approach
is based on the fact that "a multivariate normal distribution function can be
expressed as the product of sequentially conditioned univariate normal distri-
bution functions, which can be easily and accurately evaluated" (Cappelari
and Jenkins 2003, p. 280). In practical terms, the joint distribution of er-
18rors is decomposed into independent univariate normal distributions using
the Cholesky decomposition. This is achieved by drawing repeated random
samples from the error distribution.
There has been considerable argument in the literature about the identi-
￿cation of this model. In this aspect, we follow Wilde (2000), which shows
that the only condition for identi￿cation of the multivariate probit is that
there is su¢ cient variation in the data, while exclusion restrictions are not
necessary. Moreover, similarly to Adda and Lechene (2004), we construct an
indicator of the individual underlying health. This indicator (variable score)
is based on the indicators for arthritis, emotional problems and loss of mental
ability. These conditions are supposedly unrelated to the life style choices,
but give an indication of the individual underlying health. Therefore, they
are expected to in￿ uence the demand for health insurance, but not the life
style choices, acting as an additional exclusion restriction.
5 Results
In addition to the multivariate probit, we have also estimated univariate and
bivariate probit regressions. The univariate probit results are interesting to
compare with previous studies which have used the same method.
The bivariate probit has a similar structure to the multivariate probit, but
takes only two equations at a time. That is we estimate four speci￿cations
for the bivariate probit, focusing on health insurance and one of the life style
19choices at each time. The bivariate probit evaluates a bidimensional integral
with closed form solution over the distribution of residuals. Therefore, the
regressions are estimating without resorting to simulation, and can serve as
a good benchmark to compare the estimates from the multivariate probit.
5.1 E⁄ect of control variables
Results including estimated coe¢ cients for the univariate, bivariate and mul-
tivariate probit models are presented in Tables 2, 3 and 4, respectively. Let
us ￿rst consider the e⁄ect of control variables. Some patterns of e⁄ects of
control variables are consistently estimated in all three groups of models.
The constructed indicator of underlying health stock exerts positive e⁄ect
on the propensity to insure, which might be interpreted as a sign of adverse
selection. With respect to other health indicators, bad health has no e⁄ect
on health insurance, perhaps because any correlation is already being cap-
tured by the variable score, but is positively associated with heavy smoking,
sedentarism and obesity. In some cases diagnosed health conditions a⁄ect
the propensity to life style choices. However, this might be due to reverse
causality, implying that the e⁄ects should be interpreted as simple corre-
lations without any causal conotation. Generally we ￿nd that diabetes is
negatively associated with the propensity to heavy drinking, but positively
associated with the propensity to obesity. Similarly, high blood pressure has
positive association with obesity. There is also positive association of lung
disease with heavy smoking and with sedentarism.
20With respect to demographic indicators, males are more likely than fe-
males to be heavy drinkers and heavy smokers, but less likely to be insured
and obese. The e⁄ect of age is a bit contradictory. Compared to adults be-
low 30 years old, those between 41 and 64 years can be considered to engage
relatively more in unhealthy life styles. Those above 65 years, however, are
more likely to be sedentary, but less likely to be heavy smoker and obese.
This might be explained by survival e⁄ects, suggesting that individuals with
unhealthy life style are less likely to reach old age. The group above 65 years
has a higher propensity to be covered by health insurance, re￿ ecting the fact
that all individuals in this group are automatically elegible for Medicare.
There are few di⁄erences among geographical regions, but in general it is
possible to say that individual from North Central and West lead healthier
life style, and those from rural areas have lower probability to insurance. We
also notice a tendency for reduction in heavy smoking and increase in obesity
over the time.
Socioeconomic status is important to explain many life style choices.
Higher income and education decrease the likelihood to be heavy smoker,
heavy drinker5 and sedentary, but increases the propensity to health insur-
ance. White people are more heavy smokers and heavy drinkers, but less
sedentary than other ethnicities. The propensity to obesity is clearly higher
5Kenkel (1991) ￿nds that schooling has a positive e⁄ect on the total number of drinks.
This might be explained either because the stigma of alcohol consumption varies across so-
cioeconomic groups or because better educated individuals are more aware of the bene￿cial
e⁄ects of moderate alcohol consumption.
21among blacks. Students are less propense to obesity, perhaps due to an as-
sociation with age, and unemployed are more likely to be heavy drinkers.
Again, retired are more likely to be insured due to automatic Medicare cov-
erage above 65 years.
5.2 The e⁄ect of insurance on life style choices
Let us now focus on the e⁄ect of insurance coverage on the life style choices.
Table 2 shows the estimated coe¢ cients from the univariate probit regres-
sions. The univariate probit are estimated separate and independently, and
each column corresponds to a di⁄erent regression. According to this model,
insurance coverage has no e⁄ect on the propensity to be a heavy smoker,
decreases the probability of being a heavy drinker or sedentary, and is as-
sociated with an increase in the probability of obesity. Only the latter can
interpreted as evidence of ex ante moral hazard.
Based on similar results, previous published studies have argued that
health insurance does not have an incentive e⁄ect in terms of inducing ex ante
moral hazard. For example, Courbage and de Coulon (2004) use a similar
model, and ￿nd that health insurance signi￿cantly decreases the probability
of smoking, and increases the probability of practicing a sport (that is, of
being non-sedentary) and of undergoing breast screening. This approach,
however, ignores that the choice of insurance coverage is not independent
of the choice of life style. In fact, our theoretical model suggests that the
two choices are jointly or sequentially determined. Ignoring this biases the
22estimated e⁄ect of insurance on life style choices.
The bivariate and multivariate probit models recognise this problem, and
explicitly take into account the e⁄ect of unobservable attributes which in￿ u-
ence both stages of decision. Table 3 presents the bivariate probit estimates,
where life style choices are modelled as joint decisions with insurance cover-
age, allowing for unspeci￿ed correlation among the residuals. In the table,
life style equations (columns 2 to 5) are, one at a time, jointly estimated with
the insurance coverage6.
In e⁄ect, the bivariate probit coe¢ cients for insurance coverage are very
di⁄erent than those for the univariate probit. If we assume the bivariate
estimates, the e⁄ect of insurance on the propensity to heavy drinking remains
negative and signi￿cant. However, now insurance coverage exerts positive
and signi￿cant e⁄ects on the probability of being a heavy smoker, sedentary
and/or obese. This is very distinct from the results of the univariate analysis.
This also suggests the existence the existence of ex ante moral hazard in the
sense that insured individuals are more likely to be heavy smokers, sedentary
and obese.
It is instructive to analyse more closely the correlations among the resid-
uals in the insurance and life style equations (￿). This gives an estimate of
the correlation among unobservable factors which in￿ uence both decisions.
For instance, we notice a negative correlation between residuals in the heavy
6Table 3 reports the insurance equation estimated together with heavy smoking. The
results of the insurance equation with the other life style choices are very similar and are
available on request.
23smoking and insurance equations. This suggests the existence of unobserv-
able elements which, if they increase the propensity to insure, they decrease
the propensity to heavy smoking, and vice-versa. For example, it might be
the case that more risk averse people (unobservable characteristic) are more
likely to purchase health insurance and less likely to be heavy smokers, for
fear of the adverse consequences of smoking (see Kenkel (1994), p. 320,
footnote). The univariate probit model ignores this channel of correlation,
and consequently yields a negative (and incidentally not signi￿cant) esti-
mate of the e⁄ect of insurance on heavy smoking. The univariate estimate
is, nonetheless, biased.
Similarly, the residuals of the insurance equation are also negatively cor-
related with the residuals of the sedentarism equation and the obesity equa-
tion. Consequently the univariate probit coe¢ cient of the e⁄ect of insurance
is negative for sedentarism and downward biased or obesity.
With respect to heavy drinking, the correlation between residuals is posi-
tive, suggesting that unobservables increase the probability of both insurance
and heavy drinking. Therefore, both the univariate and the bivariate probit
models estimate negative e⁄ects of insurance on heavy drinking, suggesting
the absence of ex ante moral hazard in this dimension.
The multivariate probit extends the notion of controlling for unobserv-
able heterogeneity by estimating the correlation of the residuals among all
the equations in the recursive system. The ￿ve equations are estimated
simultaneously and the residuals are allowed to be freely correlated. Esti-
24mation is based on the simulation of the multivariate normal distribution of
the residuals. We set the number of draws of the simulation to 130, which is
approximatelly equal to the square root of our pooled sample size of 14,000
individuals (see Cappelari and Jenkins 2003).
The results of the multivariate probit can be considered qualitatively sim-
ilar to the bivariate probit estimates. This is a good robustness indicator,
since the bivariate probit does not rely on simulation to be estimated. Ac-
cording to the multivariate probit, health insurance increases the propensity
to heavy smoking, sedentarism and obesity, and decreases the propensity to
heavy drinking. This suggests the existence of ex ante moral hazard, at least
for the three ￿rst life style choices.
Table 5 shows the correlation among residuals in all ￿ve equations. The
￿rst column gives the correlation of residuals in the insurance equation with
those in the other four equation, suggesting a similar pattern as the bivariate
probit regressions. Unobservable attributes of the insurance decision are
negatively correlated to those that in￿ uence heavy smoking, sedentarism and
obesity.
Moreover, we notice signi￿cant correlation among residuals in the life
style equations. We ￿nd, speci￿cally, that unobservable determinants of
heavy smoking, heavy drinking and sedentarism are all positively correlated.
Similarly, there is positive association between unobservable determinants
of obesity and sedentarism. This suggests some degree of complementarity
among these life style choices. On the other hand, there is signi￿cant neg-
25ative association between unobservable determinants of heavy drinking and
obesity, suggesting these choices are substitutes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have used data from the 1999, 2001 and 2003 waves of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics to explore the e⁄ect of health insurance
coverage on life style choices. We estimated a structural model of the in-
dividual choice of insurance and of four life style related decisions: heavy
smoking, heavy drinking, sedentarism and obesity.
The underlying correlation between insurance and life style choices is
modelled using a Multivariate Probit. This structural approach assumes
that insurance coverage and the four life style choices are sequential and
interdependent decisions. Most previous studies ignore this feature and con-
sequently ￿nd that health insurance is not an important determinant of life
style choices.
The results show that health insurance has signi￿cant incentive e⁄ects on
life style choices, increasing the propensity to heavy smoking, sedentarism
and obesity. Somewhat surprisingly, however, health insurance decreases the
propensity to heavy drinking. There is also signi￿cant correlation among the
residuals of each equation. The pattern of correlation suggests that heavy
smoking and heavy drinking, and obesity and sedentarism may be considered
complementary life style choices, whilst heavy drinking and obesity may be
26considered substitutes.
The results suggest that unobserved heterogeneity plays an important
role in the sequential determination of insurance and life style. There is evi-
dence to suggest the existence of ex ante moral hazard in the choice of heavy
smoking, sedentarism and obesity. The results might also have implications
for the design of health ￿nancing policies, particularly with respect to the
use of risk rated premiums.
Incomplete data limit the interpretation of some of the results. For in-
stance, it was not possible to control for some characteristics of the insur-
ance plan, such as premium payments, level of coverage and co-payments,
and to distinguish the type of health insurance coverage, whether public
(Medicare/Medicaid), employer-sponsored or individual. However, sensitiv-
ity analysis, which restricts the sample to individuals below 65 years old
(ineligible to Medicare), suggests that the results are very robust (full results
available on request). Our measure of heavy drinking also deserves additional
attention, since it is not clear how to compare di⁄erent individuals in this
aspect.
Among the possible extensions, we would like to explore the economic
costs associated with this ex ante moral hazard e⁄ect. In particular, we would
be interested in estimating the additional costs in terms of extra medical care
use and health expenditures. Also if it were possible to control for health
plan characteristics, we would like to simulate the potential to use risk rated
premiums and co-payments in order to induce the adoption of healthier life
27styles.
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Explanatory variables insured heavysmoker heavydrinker sedentary obese
insured -0.08 -.19* -.12* .13*
score .22***
bad -0.09 .37*** 0.03 .48*** .23***
lnincome .44*** -0.05 -0.01 -.086*** -.053**
male -.41*** .58*** .82*** -.13* -.14**
age3140 -0.06 .25* 0.08 .16** .11*
age4150 -0.06 .37*** .18* .26*** -0.02
age5164 0.03 .34** 0.12 .23*** -.15*
age65above .75*** -.58*** -0.10 .32*** -.51***
married .4*** -.27*** -.31*** 0.08 0.09
kids .17*** -0.01 -0.01 .035* 0.00
stroke 0.15 -0.09 -0.01 .28*** -.27**
highbp 0.04 0.01 0.10 0.02 .53***
diabetes 0.09 -0.19 -.23* 0.05 .54***
cancer -0.16 -0.06 -0.06 0.10 0.01
lungdisease -0.03 .45*** 0.21 .21** 0.01
heartattack -0.08 0.04 -0.22 0.06 0.06
heartdisease 0.15 -0.07 0.02 0.04 0.09
hschool .29*** -.26*** -.13* -.11* 0.02
college .61*** -.72*** -.28*** -.3*** -0.04
white .44*** 1.3*** .24* -.29*** 0.04
black .36*** 0.40 .26* -0.12 .29***
housekeeper .26* -.6* 0.23 0.14 -0.05
student 0.10 -0.11 0.05 -0.11 -.48**
unemployed -0.09 0.08 .21* -0.04 -0.05
retired .3** -0.01 0.02 .14* 0.01
ncentral -0.09 0.07 -0.03 -.15** -0.08
south -.19* 0.05 -0.08 0.06 -0.07
west -.2* -.29* -0.11 -.13* -0.08
alaska 0.13 -0.11 0.00 -0.02 -0.43
urban 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.05 0.04
rural -.37** 0.07 0.02 -0.07 0.17
wave2 -0.03 -.13*** 0.05 0.01 .039*
wave3 0.00 -.18*** 0.06 -0.04 .1***
_cons -3.7*** -2.4*** -2.1*** -0.15 -0.40
Pseudo R2 0.22 0.16 0.056 0.11 0.073
N 14,557 14,517 14,540 14,515 14,344
N clusters 5,481 5,478 5,480 5,481 5,456
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01Table 3
Bivariate Probit Regressions
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables insuredy heavysmoker heavydrinker sedentary obese
insured 1.1*** -.66* .72*** .65**
score .24***
bad -0.10 .33*** 0.03 .47*** .22***
lnincome .43*** -.18*** 0.02 -.15*** -.089***
male -.4*** .66*** .77*** -0.04 -0.10
age3140 -0.04 .23* 0.07 .16** .12*
age4150 -0.05 .34*** .17* .26*** -0.01
age5164 0.03 .28** 0.12 .21** -.15*
age65above .75*** -.71*** -0.08 .22** -.54***
married .41*** -.35*** -.28*** 0.01 0.06
kids .17*** -0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.01
stroke 0.15 -0.12 0.00 .26** -.28**
highbp 0.03 -0.01 0.10 0.01 .52***
diabetes 0.10 -0.18 -.22* 0.03 .53***
cancer -0.15 0.00 -0.07 0.12 0.02
lungdisease -0.06 .39*** 0.22 .21** 0.01
heartattack -0.10 0.05 -0.22 0.06 0.06
heartdisease 0.16 -0.10 0.02 0.03 0.08
hschool .28*** -.32*** -0.11 -.15*** -0.01
college .6*** -.79*** -.26*** -.36*** -0.07
white .46*** .87*** .27** -.35*** 0.00
black .37*** 0.19 .28* -.18* .26***
housekeeper .25* -.59* 0.24 0.09 -0.07
student 0.11 -0.11 0.06 -0.13 -.48**
unemployed -0.10 0.11 .19* 0.00 -0.03
retired .29** -0.12 0.04 0.08 -0.02
ncentral -0.07 0.09 -0.03 -.14* -0.08
south -.18* 0.09 -0.08 0.07 -0.06
west -.18* -0.19 -0.11 -0.11 -0.08
alaska 0.05 -0.15 0.01 -0.04 -0.45
urban 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04
rural -.36** 0.17 0.00 -0.01 .19*
wave2 -0.04 -.1** 0.05 0.01 .041*
wave3 0.00 -.16*** 0.06 -0.04 .1***
_cons -3.6*** -1.6** -2*** -0.07 -.44*
￿ -0.73*** 0.25** -0.48*** -0.29**
N 14,517 14,517 14,540 14,515 14,344
N cluster 5,478 5,478 5,480 5,481 5,456
Legend:y estimates from insured and heavysmoker regression; * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01Table 4
Multivariate Probit Regression
Dependent variable
Explanatory variables insured heavysmoker heavydrinker sedentary obese
insured .64** -.38* .54** .49***
score .27***
bad -.12* .37*** 0.03 .47*** .23***
lnincome .44*** -.11** 0.00 -.14*** -.077***
male -.39*** .63*** .8*** -0.06 -.11**
age3140 -0.04 .24** 0.08 .16** .11**
age4150 -0.06 .36*** .17** .27*** -0.02
age5164 0.03 .31*** 0.14 .22*** -.15**
age65above .78*** -.65*** -0.08 .24** -.53***
married .41*** -.31*** -.3*** 0.02 0.07
kids .17*** -0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.00
stroke 0.09 -0.09 0.01 .28*** -.29***
highbp 0.02 0.01 .1* 0.02 .53***
diabetes 0.10 -.19* -.27** 0.03 .52***
cancer -0.16 -0.03 -0.06 0.13 0.02
lungdisease -0.07 .41*** .22* .22*** 0.00
heartattack -0.07 0.04 -0.22 0.06 0.06
heartdisease 0.15 -0.10 0.03 0.04 0.08
hschool .28*** -.29*** -.12* -.14*** 0.00
college .6*** -.76*** -.26*** -.35*** -0.06
white .42*** 1.1*** .28** -.32*** 0.01
black .35*** 0.28 .29** -.14* .27***
housekeeper 0.22 -.59* 0.21 0.13 -0.08
student 0.11 -0.07 0.04 -0.10 -.48**
unemployed -0.09 0.10 .2* -0.01 -0.04
retired .3*** -0.04 0.04 0.09 -0.01
ncentral -0.04 0.09 -0.05 -.15** -.082*
south -.15* 0.07 -0.10 0.06 -0.07
west -.16* -.24** -0.12 -.12* -0.08
alaska 0.12 -0.12 0.02 -0.06 -0.45
urban 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.05 0.04
rural -.35*** 0.15 0.01 -0.03 .19**
wave2 -0.03 -.12* 0.05 0.02 0.04
wave3 0.00 -.18** 0.04 -0.04 .1***
_cons -3.8*** -2.2*** -2*** -0.13 -.43*
N 14,260 14,260 14,260 14,260 14,260
draws 130 130 130 130 130
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01Table 5
Correlation of Residuals from the Multivariate Probit
insured heavysmoker heavydrinker sedentary obese
insured 1.00
heavysmoker -0.41*** 1.00
heavydrinker 0.09 0.33*** 1.00
sedentary -0.37*** 0.19*** 0.07** 1.00
obese -0.2** -0.04 -0.06** 0.09*** 1.00
Legend: * p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01
36Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Economiques
International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives and Development
IRISS Working Papers
The IRISS Working Paper Series has been created in 1999 to ensure a timely dissemination of the research outcome
from the IRISS-C/I programme. They are meant to stimulate discussion and feedback. The working papers are
contributed by CEPS/INSTEAD resident staff, research associates and visiting researchers.
The ﬁfteen most recent papers
Stanciole A., ‘Health Insurance and Life Style Choices: Identifying the Ex Ante Moral Hazard’, IRISS WP 2007-10,
November 2007.
Raileanu Szeles M., ‘The patterns and causes of social exclusion in Luxembourg’, IRISS WP 2007-09, August 2007.
Mussard S. & Philippe B., ‘Une évaluation du rôle des déterminants du partage de la valeur ajoutée’, IRISS WP
2007-08, June 2007.
Voicu B., Voicu M. & Strapkova K., ‘Engendered housework. A cross-european analysis’, IRISS WP 2007-07, May
2007.
Kankarash M. & Moors G., ‘Heterogeneity in solidarity attitudes in Europe. Insights from a multiple-group latent-
class factor approach’, IRISS WP 2007-06, April 2007.
Valentova M., ‘Attitudes to Family Policy Arrangements in Relation to Attitudes to Family and division of Labour
between Genders’, IRISS WP 2007-05, May 2007.
Valentova M., Krizova I. & Katrnak T., ‘Occupational Gender Segregation in the light of the Segregation in Education:
A Cross-National Comparison’, IRISS WP 2007-04, April 2007.
Mussard S. & Terraza M., ‘Décompositions des mesures dinégalité : le cas des coefﬁcients de Gini et d’entropie’,
IRISS WP 2007-03, April 2007.
Mussard S., ‘Between-Group Pigou-Dalton Transfers’, IRISS WP 2007-02, March 2007.
Van Kerm P., ‘Extreme incomes and the estimation of poverty and inequality indicators from EU-SILC’, IRISS WP
2007-01, February 2007.
Fusco A., ‘Les mesures monétaires et directes de la pauvreté sont-elles substituables ? Investigations sur base de
la courbe du ROC’, IRISS WP 2006-13, December 2006.
Sirovatka T. & Valentova M., ‘The Legitimacy of Redistribution: the Czech Republic in International Comparison’,
IRISS WP 2006-12, November 2006.
Voicu M., Voicu B. & Strapcova K., ‘Housework and gender inequality across Europe’, IRISS WP 2006-11, November
2006.
Makdissi P. & Mussard S., ‘Between-Group Transfers and Poverty-Reducing Tax Reforms’, IRISS WP 2006-10,
October 2006.
Makdissi P. & Mussard S., ‘Decomposition of s-Concentration Curves’, IRISS WP 2006-09, October 2006.
Electronic versions
Electronic versions of all IRISS Working Papers are available for download at
http://www.ceps.lu/iriss/wps.cfm
1Centre d'Etudes de Populations, de Pauvreté et de Politiques Socio-Economiques
International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives and Development
IRISS-C/I is a visiting researchers programme at CEPS/INSTEAD, a socio-economic policy and research centre
based in Luxembourg. It ﬁnances and organises short visits of researchers willing to undertake empirical research
in economics and other social sciences using the archive of micro-data available at the Centre.
What is offered?
In 1998, CEPS/INSTEAD has been identiﬁed by the European Commission as one of the few Large Scale Facilities
in the social sciences, and, since then, offers researchers (both junior and senior) the opportunity to spend time
carrying out their own research using the local research facilities. This programme is currently sponsored by the
European Community’s 6th Framework Programme. Grants cover travel expenses and on-site accommodation. The
expected duration of visits is in the range of 2 to 12 weeks.
Topics
The major resource offered to visitors is access to a series of internationally comparable longitudinal surveys on liv-
ing conditions at the household and individual level. The anonymised micro-data provide information on wages and
income, health, education, employment and professional activities, accommodation, social relations,... Comparable
micro-data are available for EU countries, Central European countries, as well as the USA. These data offer oppor-
tunities to carry out research in ﬁelds such as survey and panel data methodology, income distribution and welfare,
income and poverty dynamics, multi-dimensional indicators of poverty and deprivation, gender, ethnic and social
inequality, unemployment and labour supply behaviour, education and training, social protection and redistributive
policies, fertility and family structures, new information technologies in households and ﬁrms, ...
Who may apply?
All individuals (doctoral students as well as experienced academics) conducting research in an institution within the
EU-25 or an FP6 Associated State. IRISS-C/I can be meeting place for groups of researchers working on a joint
project. We therefore encourage joint proposals by two or more researchers.
For more detailed information and application form, please consult our website: http://www.ceps.lu/iriss or contact
us at
IRISS-C/I, CEPS/INSTEAD
BP 48, L-4501 Differdange, G.-D. Luxembourg
Tel: +352 585855 610; Fax: +352 585588
E-mail: iriss@ceps.lu
2